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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE EDUCATION 
FINANCE DISTRIBUTION FORMULAS: 
MOVING FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY 
R. CRAIG WOOD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There has been an intense struggle concerning fiscal resources involving 
public elementary and secondary education for many years.  There are at least 
six concepts that render powerless any hesitancy concerning the importance of 
financial resources and public elementary and secondary education.1  The first 
concept is that public elementary and secondary schools indeed distribute 
economic and social opportunities in a nation fueled by competitiveness.  The 
second concept is that these opportunities depend in large measure on the 
quality of the public elementary and secondary schools these children attend.  
The third concept is that despite a lack of strong productivity equations, school 
quality is heavily conditioned by fiscal resources that are purchased with 
money.  The fourth concept is that absent ability to purchase these inputs, 
public elementary and secondary education must fail because altruism is not a 
sufficient offsetting condition within our society.  The fifth concept is that 
people who argue for the irrelevance of money still prefer a larger share.  The 
sixth concept is that until money is irrefutably shown to make no difference, its 
effect must be presumed from the behavior of wealthy individuals who choose 
wealthy communities with high expenditure school districts for their children. 
While education finance as a discipline has only emerged since the early 
1900s, issues of taxation have been at the forefront of thought since the early 
days of the nation, and it is only a small step to move the financing of public 
education into that stream of political and legal activity.2  This is especially 
true when the wider implications of education finance are considered, such as 
equality of educational opportunity as it relates to matters of discrimination 
 
* Dr. R. Craig Wood is the B.O. Smith Research Professor at the University of Florida’s College 
of Education and a Past-President of the Educational Law Association.  He has recently been 
involved in legislative activities over Missouri’s most recent school finance action. 
 1. This following portion borrows extensively from R.C. WOOD & D.C. THOMPSON, 
FINANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EDUCATION (forthcoming 2004). 
 2. See R.C. WOOD & D.C. THOMPSON, EDUCATION FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS, AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY 6 (2d ed. 1996). 
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and opportunity.  The study of education finance litigation is actually the study 
of the litigation of state aid distribution formulas and the results of those 
formulas in terms of the expenditure and revenue patterns to school districts.3 
At the federal level, litigation has focused on the Federal Constitution in 
the context of interpreting the limits of federal responsibility to embrace 
education and on any guarantees construed in the Constitution.  At the state 
level, litigation has been focused on the constitutional, as well as statutory, 
provisions of the individual states.  At both levels, these questions have been 
complex and difficult.  Within this legal environment is the constant issue of 
whether the parties have been able to prove their arguments and statements via 
sound methodological research and data in terms of acceptable education 
finance statistics and research design.  In these instances litigants have sought 
to determine the meaning and extent of equal opportunity and to test the 
strength and limits of constitutional and statutory language.  The challenges to 
education finance distribution formulas have traditionally centered on three 
strategies: education as a fundamental right, the equal protection of the laws, 
and the education articles of the individual state constitutions.  Historically, 
education finance litigation has focused its efforts on issues of equality and 
opportunity.  Recently, more cases have addressed the adequacy of education 
finance distribution formulas in terms of meeting state constitutional and 
statutory guidelines. 
II.  FEDERAL ROOTS 
Legal struggles concerning the financing of public education are 
longstanding.  Litigation has raised both federal and state questions based on 
particular strategies aimed at various features of federal and state laws as well 
as the applicable state constitutional clauses. 4 
While no federal school finance lawsuits existed before the mid-twentieth 
century,5 the foundations were laid by American preoccupation with equality 
and supported by a series of broader issues with education finance overtones 
that would only later become apparent.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s equality 
provisions led to three litigation strands that were to have a powerful impact 
concerning education finance. 6  The first strand was a series of lawsuits under 
the concept of desegregation, in which enforcement of equality before the law 
for all persons was sought.7  The second strand was a series of cases known as 
 
 3. For a thorough discussion of education finance litigation, see id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. For the earliest known federal school finance lawsuit, see Pitts v. Bd. of Trustees, 84 F. 
Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark 1949). 
 6. See Phillip B. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional 
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583, 584-87 (1968). 
 7. The history of racial equality is too complex to fully describe herein.  In an educational 
context, it is obvious that Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954), was the most critical.  
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the reapportionment decisions, establishing the principle of “one man, one 
vote.”8  The third strand emerged from lawsuits that became known as the 
indigent defendants and administration of criminal justice cases.9  These cases 
established that defendants may not be denied the right of appeal simply 
because of inability to pay for a transcript of trial proceedings as such denial is 
tantamount to wealth discrimination.10  Although seemingly unrelated to 
education finance, these strands were to lay a framework for equal protection 
in resource distribution. 
Desegregation cases were obvious for the eventual impact on public 
schools.  Desegregation cases were fervently contested for many years, with 
great overtones for the costs and structure of public elementary and secondary 
education.11  The question of whether differential wealth, under certain 
circumstances, could be a barrier to equality under the law began to emerge 
over time.  If this were true, an entirely new meaning of equality would be 
formed. 
These strands were actually the expression and extension of judicial 
sympathy to a fairly liberal construction of the meaning of equality that had 
already resulted in the establishment of certain fundamental rights under the 
law.  In addition to the rights and liberties specifically guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court had at various times enumerated 
several other rights which it found to be so fundamental that these rights could 
not be abridged or denied except by the most exacting due process of law.12  
Several of these rights were established in the cases that formed the three 
 
However, this analysis is aided by recognition that a long history of such cases exist, which in an 
educational context included e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); 
Gong Lum v. Rice,  275 U.S. 78 (1927); Carter v. Sch. Bd., 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950); Davis v. 
County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. 
Tex. 1949); Pitts v. Bd. of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949); and Freeman v. County 
Sch. Bd., 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948). 
 8. These cases are also multiple and meaningful.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 
(holding that accidents of geography and arbitrary boundaries of governments may not be a basis 
for discrimination among otherwise equal citizens, in this instance forbidding the requirement 
that one must be pay property taxes in order to vote).  See also Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 276 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
 9. Kurland, supra note 6, at 586-87. 
 10. These cases are also multiple and far ranging.  See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 
(1974) (a filing fee as prerequisite to the right to vote is wealth discrimination); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (a law against bringing indigents into a state violated the right to 
interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (a state poll tax was 
wealth discrimination); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (denying an indigent defendant a 
transcript of trial for appeal was wealth discrimination). 
 11. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 461 (1982). 
 12. See WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 58. 
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strands of litigation; the Court had found fundamental rights to interstate 
travel, procreation, voting, and the right to criminal appeal.13  The essence of 
fundamental rights, however many or few, is to assure the equality of each 
citizen so that arbitrary abridgment of certain freedoms could never be 
countenanced in a democratic nation. 
The effect of the Fourteenth Amendment’s nondiscrimination clause was 
to entrust two distinct lines of litigation.  The first line resulted from unequal 
treatment of a suspect class.  As defined by the courts, various conditions 
might lead to the establishment of a suspect class where “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry.”14  Subsequent litigation created suspect 
classes for race, national origin, and alienage, with special empathy for other 
sensitive constitutional concerns.15  This first line of litigation drew its basis 
from illegitimate differential treatment on the basis of immutability whereby 
people were discriminated against for characteristics they could not change.  
The second line of litigation resulted from abridgment of some fundamental 
right.  This second line drew justification from constitutional provisions or, 
alternatively, whether the Supreme Court would construe a new fundamental 
right for reasons of its own. 
The concepts of suspect class and fundamental rights were vitally 
important to equal protection litigation because if courts were persuaded that a 
fundamental right was violated or a suspect class was discriminated against, 
courts would evaluate an act or a law with searching scrutiny.  Race was 
clearly immutable, and an alleged violation of the rights of a member of this 
suspect class would trigger an exacting analysis under anti-discrimination 
equal protection laws; similarly, abridgment of a fundamental right would 
trigger the same sharp scrutiny.16  Under these conditions, establishing the 
characteristics of suspect classes and increasing the number of suspect classes 
became paramount to successful Equal Protection Clause challenges.  The 
second line of litigation was equally critical, in that any right declared to be 
fundamental would demand strict scrutiny under the law.17  These key 
concepts were thus the first strategy of Equal Protection Clause analysis, 
 
 13. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 14. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 15. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1967); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
 16. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (indicating that race is a 
suspect class). 
 17. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988) (explaining that the 
interference of a fundamental right involves strict scrutiny). 
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because if a violation of a fundamental right was shown or if a suspect class 
was established, then the burden of proof would shift to the defendant, i.e., the 
state, to show a compelling interest in the law.18  This test of strict scrutiny 
became the sought-after judicial standard, as the only other standard, rational 
basis, would require only some sensible reason to allow a law to stand.19 
As Phillip Kurland has noted, the concepts derived from these three 
broader strands were quickly applied to education, wherein litigants launched 
concerted efforts to establish suspect classes and fundamentality in 
education.20  Although the origins of equality in American law are more 
complex than briefly stated within this article, these strands illustrate why it 
was ultimately sensible in a historical context to first bring lawsuits involving 
public elementary and secondary education at the federal level.  Regardless of 
whether the topic was race discrimination or fiscal resources, the goal of any 
such lawsuit would be to seek federal protection, wherein inequality would be 
alleged and from which it would be claimed that equal educational opportunity 
was denied.  Thus, from a simple hierarchical perspective, if education was 
found in some way to merit the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
especially in areas where abridgment would be severely proscribed, new 
federal law would be written which would also be controlling on the states.  
The first alternative required a ruling that education was a fundamental right.  
Failing this, the only other alternative was to establish a protected class against 
whom illegitimate discrimination in education could be shown. 
Winning a federal lawsuit was thus critical.  If the broader cases could be 
analogized to education, their successful application meant the establishment 
of constitutional protections in a totally new arena.  If neither a fundamental 
right nor a suspect class was established, failure was assured because the 
doctrine of limited federal powers given the Tenth Amendment’s silence 
regarding education21 would release the coveted claims of federal protection; 
failure of a federal case meant that equality of educational opportunity would 
either be lost or turned to the states without the power of the Federal 
Constitution.  Thus, from a historical perspective, the thinking of the early 
education finance scholars was clear, if not flawed in the reality of the 
overwhelming complexity of the question. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Millken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 n.19 (1974) (explaining that the burden 
of proof shifts upon establishing racial discrimination). 
 19. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981) (reasoning that social legislation 
that does not impinge upon fundamental rights must be upheld against an equal protection 
challenge when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose). 
 20. Kurland, supra note 6, at 584-87. 
 21. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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III.  THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
Although federal litigation regarding racial equality spanned many 
decades,22 it was in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 23 decision when 
equality of educational opportunity under the law received its greatest impetus.  
In an often-quoted passage the Court proclaimed: 
. . . [E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures 
for education demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society.  It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.24 
Invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Brown spoke strongly to the value of education, calling it one of the most 
important functions of government and noting its central role to preservation of 
literate and free people.25  The Supreme Court in Brown declared that 
education was a right that must be made available on equal terms.26  Thus, 
Brown opened a new era of justice from which a whole field of civil and 
educational rights litigation would occupy the nation’s court system for several 
decades. 
It could be argued that if the Court’s apparent mandate in Brown were to 
be satisfied fully, educational opportunity would have strong application to 
fiscal resources as uneven revenues are at the root of most other forms of 
inequality.  Although it had not been a simple matter to force condemnation of 
racial inequality, at least there had been a long record of discrimination 
lawsuits against which concepts and theories could be empirically tested.  In 
education finance inequality there was no rich history on which to rely.  The 
question first became one of a conceptual nature, rather than a formal legal 
standard, from which litigants would be forced to argue.  The only other 
alternative was to analogize to the strands cited earlier, supported by the strong 
 
 22. Litigation regarding this issue is longstanding; e.g., a Massachusetts court in 1850 
addressed school segregation under Massachusetts’s 1780 equality statute.  Roberts v. City of 
Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). 
 23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 24. Id. at 493. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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language of Brown.  By the 1960s, plaintiffs had formulated arguments and 
were ready to file actions before the federal courts. 
The first strand of unequal treatment under the law seemed well 
established in Brown because schoolchildren must be provided equal 
opportunity.  The second strand also seemed viable because it was reasonable 
to draw an equal protection analogy to geographic discrimination, as it was 
widely known that educational opportunity varied greatly based on residence.  
The third strand also seemed applicable, as there was sufficient case law to 
argue that wealth may not serve to bar equality under the law.  Of particular 
support to the latter theory was the belief that school district wealth could be 
the basis of wealth discrimination, i.e., leading to establishment of a new 
suspect class.  In plaintiffs’ minds, wealth suspectness was grounded in case 
law, and it was simply a matter of transferring the Brown logic condemning 
racial inequality to fiscal inequality.  Plaintiffs relied on the fact that the 
Supreme Court had long ago stated in United States v. Carolene Products that 
“[p]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily . . . relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”27  In addition, there were the 
voting rights and criminal appeals cases, cited earlier, in which the Court had 
held that classifications based on wealth were to be strictly scrutinized.28 
These conditions seemed ripe for a federal decision extending equality of 
educational opportunity to include fiscal equality.  The first suit to be filed was 
Burruss v. Wilkerson, brought in Virginia in 1968.29  The plaintiffs in Burruss 
based their claims on the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that inequality in the 
school division’s (district’s) physical and instructional facilities resulted in a 
lack of equal protection of the law because the quality varied among school 
divisions.30  The three-judge United States District Court panel which heard 
oral arguments rendered a decision in May 1969, stating that while 
The existence of such deficiencies and differences is forcefully put by 
plaintiffs’ counsel . . . we do not believe they are creatures of discrimination by 
the State . . . our reexamination of the Act confirms that the cities and counties 
receive State funds under a uniform and consistent plan . . . we can only see to 
it that the outlays on one group are not invidiously greater or less than that of 
another . . . no such arbitrariness is manifest here.31 
 
 27. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 28. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).  This logic was especially 
supported as the Court had stated in Harper, in ruling against a poll tax, that “[l]ines drawn on the 
basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are disfavored.”  Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. 
 29. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). 
 30. Id. at 573. 
 31. Id. at 574. 
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The court added that although 
plaintiffs seek to obtain allocations of State funds among the cities and 
counties so that the pupil in each of them will enjoy the same educational 
opportunities . . . , the courts have neither the knowledge, nor means, nor the 
power to tailor the public monies to fit the varying needs of these students 
throughout the state.32 
A second federal case, McInnis v. Shapiro, was decided in Illinois in the 
same year.33  Heard in United States District Court and affirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court under the name McInnis v. Ogilvie,34 McInnis was also a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection suit seeking to overturn the state 
education funding formula on the grounds that unequal educational 
expenditures based on variable property values as tax rates of local districts 
were arbitrary and an unreasonable denial of equal protection of the law.35  The 
Court ruled for the defendant state.36  The Court noted several features that 
were to become summative of the federal position in school finance litigation.  
While the Court acknowledged wide variations in expenditures per pupil based 
on wealth, the Court stated its vulnerability before the question in three 
respects.37  First, variations in revenue were not on the face invidious and 
arbitrary.38  Second, the legislature’s decision to allow local choice and 
experimentation was reasonable, particularly because the common school fund 
placed, at that time, a $400 minimum base under each student.39  Third, the 
Court ruled that there was no constitutional requirement establishing rigid 
guidelines for equal dollar expenditures under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause provisions.40  And fourth, the Court was clear in 
stating that allocation of revenue was a policy decision better suited to 
legislatures.41 
In both instances federal courts had uniformly refused to intervene on three 
importantly consistent grounds.  The first rationale was a plain reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, noting no equal protection mandate for unequal 
revenues.42  The second rationale was equally important, as the court deferred 
to the legislative branch by relying on the separation of powers doctrine in the 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
 34. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). 
 35. Id. at 328-29. 
 36. Id. at 336-37. 
 37. Id. at 331. 
 38. Id. at 332. 
 39. McInnis, 394 U.S. at 333. 
 40. Id. at 335-36. 
 41. Id. at 336-37. 
 42. Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574; McInnis, 293 F. Supp. at 336. 
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absence of blatant invidious discrimination.43  The third rationale applied to the 
court’s bewilderment as it noted its lack of judicially manageable standards, 
even if it were to rule for plaintiffs.44  Equality, then, to the federal court was a 
negative standard, in that no affirmative duty was owed by the state to each 
child for resource equality; rather, the absence of something was not the same 
as invidious denial of that object. 
The final federal issues were determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.45  The case had actually 
been filed in 1968, and a three-judge panel had rendered a decision in 1971 
holding the Texas system of school finance unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.46  The case was then accepted on appeal by the United 
States Supreme Court.47  The plaintiffs argued key points taken from earlier 
successful, but broader litigation.48  The plaintiffs contended that the Texas 
funding system violated the federal Equal Protection Clause by discriminating 
against a class of poor and that students were denied their right to an 
education.49  Plaintiffs were actually arguing for wealth as a suspect class and 
for fundamentality at the highest level in an all-out effort to force strict judicial 
scrutiny.50 
The Supreme Court, however, refused to accept plaintiffs’ arguments as it 
found no class of persons who were identifiably suspect.51  The plaintiffs 
argued that that the injured class should be comprised of all students living in 
poor school districts, rather than poor students themselves.52  Justice Powell, 
writing for the majority, noted that wealth discrimination in prior cases had 
historically been confined by the Court to personal wealth and that the class in 
Rodriguez was not one for which special protection is usually provided; i.e., it 
was neither politically powerless, discrete, or an insular minority.53  The Court 
further noted that individual income did not necessarily correlate with district 
wealth and that even if the correlation were strong, the Court’s historic 
application of wealth discrimination under strict scrutiny had been limited to 
absolute deprivation rather than relative differences.54  Under these conditions, 
 
 43. Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574; McInnis, 293 F. Supp. at 336-37. 
 44. Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574; McInnis, 293 F. Supp. at 335-36. 
 45. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 46. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 
 47. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1. 
 48. Id. at 4-6. 
 49. David C. Thompson, School Finance and the Courts: A Reanalysis of Progress, 59 
WEST’S EDUC. L. REV. 945, 948 (1990). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25-28. 
 52. Id. at 19-20. 
 53. Id. at 27-28. 
 54. Id. at 20-22  (noting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (on transcripts) and Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (on hiring counsel)). 
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the Court found no distinct suspect class and held that because no student was 
absolutely deprived of an education, fiscal inequalities were of only relative 
difference and not entitled to wealth suspectness.55 
The Court in Rodriquez then turned to plaintiffs’ claims for 
fundamentality, again refusing to accept their arguments.56  Plaintiffs had 
recognized the difficulty of this argument and had based their claims on the 
relationship of education to other extant fundamental rights in an effort to 
establish a clear nexus.57  In this concept, public education was inextricably 
tied to other existing fundamental rights wherein the intelligent exercise of the 
right to vote and the right to free speech were said to depend on education.  
The Supreme Court refused these arguments, however, stating that it saw no 
more connection between public education and these rights than it could find 
between housing, food, or other subsistence and the right to vote.58  The 
Supreme Court especially noted a difference between hindering a child from a 
public education and the state education finance distribution formula that, in its 
view, instead sought to improve available offerings.59  Although the Supreme 
Court noted wide disparities among Texas school districts, it rejected the 
standard of strict scrutiny, stating that a rational relationship was all that was 
required to defend a state distribution formula where no invidious 
discrimination could be found.60  In Rodriquez, a rational basis could be found 
in the state’s goal of promoting local control of schools — a view supported by 
the Supreme Court’s own words: 
Education, perhaps even more than welfare, presents a myriad of intractable 
economic, social, and even philosophical problems.  The very complexity of 
the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system 
suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method 
of solving them, and that, within the limits of rationality, the legislature’s 
efforts to tackle the problems should be entitled to respect.61 
The concept, as expressed in Rodriquez, was rejected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.62  Contrary to Brown, there was apparently no fundamental right, no 
 
 55. Id. at 25. 
 56. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
 57. It will be shown below that this claim was not entirely novel, as it had been successfully 
utilized in California.  See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).  It had not, however, 
been tried at the federal level, even though the state court in Serrano invoked the Fourteenth 
Amendment in its decision.  The lack of demarcation between overlapping federal and state 
chronology should be noted, as state litigation had already begun following McInnis and Burruss, 
but prior to Rodriguez. 
 58. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
 59. Id. at 39. 
 60. Id. at 40-44. 
 61. Id. at 42 (internal citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 44. 
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suspect class, and no equal protection for education except in cases of total 
educational deprivation or in the established instances of invidious 
discrimination such as race.  It appeared from Rodriguez that little equality of 
educational opportunity could be gained apart from race, as the Supreme Court 
had sanctioned legislative prerogative and declared judicially unmanageable 
standards, while unwilling to go beyond the historically narrow application of 
the race relations. 
The Supreme Court ruling in Rodriguez had one primary effect concerning 
education finance litigation.  The effect was to turn litigants’ attention to the 
state courts. 
IV.  THE POST-RODRIGUEZ AFTERMATH 
Although Rodriguez dictated that legal challenges to education finance 
distribution formulas would have to originate in the states, there were three 
other federal cases coming after Rodriguez.  In Papasan v. Allain, plaintiff 
school districts in Mississippi argued for a violation of the federal Equal 
Protection Clause in revenue differences based on Section 16 land income lost 
during the War Between the States.63  Although the state of Mississippi had 
provided aid to help offset those losses, by 1981 state funds were only $.63 per 
pupil compared to $75.34 per pupil in districts whose lands had not been lost.64  
Originally dismissed in federal district court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that equal protection would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment but 
also held that Rodriguez was the controlling standard on disparate funding.65  
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the immunity decision but reversed on the 
equal protection issue, and it remanded the case for development because the 
countenance of discrimination absent a legitimate state interest was sufficient 
to state a cause of action.66  Papasan is thus important for what it stated and for 
what it failed to state.  The complaint did not raise the issue of fundamentality, 
so that the federal court dealt only with a narrow legal question.67  In addition, 
 
 63. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 274 (1986).  “Section Sixteen” lands were first 
introduced by the Land Ordinance of 1785.  The ordinance provided for the survey and sale of the 
Northwest Territory and “reserved the lot No. 16, of every township, for the maintenance of 
public schools within the said township . . .”  Id. at 268 (citing 1 Laws of the United States 
(1815)).  In Mississippi, these lands “constitute property held in trust for the benefit of the public 
schools and must be treated as such.”  MISS. CODE. ANN. § 29-3-1. 
 64. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 273. 
 65. Amendment XI to the United States Constitution reads “The judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign state.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 66. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 281-82. 
 67. Id. at 282. 
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a glimmer of federal interest in education finance was seen on remand, as the 
court noted that unreasonable government action would be scrutinized.68 
The second important federal case after Rodriguez was also from Texas, as 
the Supreme Court ruled in Plyler v. Doe that refusal by a state to educate 
undocumented school-aged children involved an area of special sensitivity that 
would merit constitutional pleas of equal protection.69  While the Court in 
Plyler stopped short of declaring education a fundamental right, it stated a 
higher level of scrutiny and interest in cases of educational deprivation, 
utilizing language that seemed less closed to fundamentality under such 
conditions.  The Plyler majority stated that while its ruling in Rodriguez 
remained intact, it was deeply concerned that education was more than a mere 
service and convenience to citizens.70  The Supreme Court stated: 
Education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead 
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.  In sum, education has a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.  We cannot ignore 
the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied 
the means to absorb the values and skills on which our social order rests.71 
The third and final important federal case occurred in 1988 in Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools.72  In Kadrmas, the plaintiffs had argued that 
charging for school bus service was, in fact, denial of equal protection because 
the plaintiff child was wealth-disadvantaged.73  Although the Court found for 
the defendant state, its five to four vote was sharply divided and indicative of 
the constantly unsettled nature of a federal claim involving education and 
further noted in strong language that there are variances and exceptions that 
preclude absolutism in interpreting Rodriguez.74  Kadrmas stands as the most 
recent proof of this indeterminateness, as the dissenting opinion sharply stated: 
The Court therefore does not address the question whether a state 
constitutionally could deny a child access to a minimally adequate education.  
In prior cases this court explicitly has left open the question whether such a 
 
 68. Although only four federal cases are discussed herein, there were actually five such 
cases, as in 1987 plaintiffs in Livingston v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary 
Educ. claimed equal protection, arguing that the state aid plan was arbitrary and discriminated 
against school districts with large homestead exemptions.  Livingston v. Louisiana State Bd. of 
Elem. and Secondary Educ., 830 F.2d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1987).  This case is only included as a 
note because like Papasan, it was narrowly drawn and did not claim inadequate education or a 
fundamental right. 
 69. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-24 (1982). 
 70. See id. at 221. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988).  For a more complete discussion 
of Kadrmas see R. Craig Wood, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: A Further Retreat from 
Equality of Educational Opportunity, 15 J. OF EDUC. FIN. 429  (1990). 
 73. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458. 
 74. See generally id. 
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deprivation of access would violate a fundamental constitutional right.  That 
question remains open today.75 
From these challenges, several observations may be stated.  First, it can be 
gathered that the Supreme Court is sympathetic to the problems of judicially 
manageable standards.  Second, the Supreme Court is quick to uphold 
legislative prerogative.  Third, the Supreme Court is reluctant to declare 
education a fundamental right, and any reversal is not likely to occur lightly.  
Fourth, the Supreme Court is not yet willing to create new suspect 
classifications.  Fifth, in the case of education, the Supreme Court has narrowly 
interpreted equal protection to mean racial equality or, alternatively, to mean 
absolute deprivation which has fiscal overtones.  Sixth, Rodriguez has been the 
controlling precedent in subsequent litigation, and the Supreme Court itself has 
utilized Rodriguez to reject further assaults on a federal educational right.  But 
seventh, all assaults following Rodriguez have been narrowly drawn, and it is 
clear the Supreme Court holds an undefined interest in education that may 
eventually emerge.  Future federal cases will depend on changes in the 
Supreme Court’s make-up.  But it is finally clear that no firm federal case yet 
exists — a reality that has in fact effectively turned most traditionally pure 
education finance litigation to the state courts for adjudication. 
A. State Court Tests 
Legal struggles concerning the financing of public schools have occurred 
for more than 100 years.  The perception of recency concerning education 
finance litigation is particularly misguided.  Federal claims beginning in 1968 
lend the appearance that education finance litigation is only a modern 
phenomenon.  The intensive state-level reform following the failed federal test 
in Rodriguez has confirmed the impression of recency.  But while a lengthy 
history of education finance litigation could be drawn,76 it is more instructive 
in the modern context to examine the state court test in the post-Rodriguez 
light because these events have had the greatest impact in shaping current 
education finance constitutional challenges. 
 
 75. Id. at 466 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 76. School finance litigation could be readily traced into the Nineteenth Century, where 
complex roots of other issues impacting education finance can be understood; e.g., school 
finance-related litigation can be seen in Stuart v. Sch. Dist. of the Vill. of Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 
69, 70 (1874), where a court determined the power to lay and collect taxes for the support of 
secondary schools.  See also Morton Salt Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 177 F.2d 889, 892 
(10th Cir. 1949) (court noted that no direct benefit need accrue to taxpayers if the taxes were 
uniform and for public purposes benefiting the entire public); Lewis v. Mosley, 204 So. 2d 197, 
201 (Fla. 1967) (court ruled that laws providing for taxation must be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer when questions of court discretion arise); Sawyer v. Gilmore, 83 A. 673 (Me. 1912) 
(court enunciated the Rodriguez-like principle of legislative discretion in the manner and amount 
of tax distributions to schools). 
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B. The State Response 
There has been considerable overlap in the chronology of federal and state 
lawsuits, as well as the issues framing the various challenges to unequal fiscal 
resources.  Chronological overlap occurred as lawsuits were brought in both 
federal and state courts in the early days of reform.  Burruss, McInnis, and 
Rodriguez were brought in federal court under Fourteenth Amendment claims 
in the 1960s, but Serrano had previously been decided at the California State 
Supreme Court level before the United States Supreme Court finally reached 
its ruling in Rodriguez in 1973.77  Overlap of issues occurred in like form, as 
the federal cases obviously addressed federal equal protection and as state 
cases such as Serrano also commonly brought both federal and state 
constitutional claims.  There are no lines of demarcation as might be implied 
from the earlier federal discussion; however, state litigation has become the 
standard fare in the post-Rodriguez era. 
The state test is usually marked with the historic ruling of the California 
Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest.78  Destined to become the classic model 
for state education finance litigation, the plaintiffs charged that the state 
financial aid distribution formula for public school districts violated the federal 
and state constitutions’ guarantees of equal protection.79  Inherent within these 
allegations were concepts of fundamentality, wealth suspectness, and equal 
protection under the state constitution to which reformers had earlier pinned 
their hopes in the failed federal test.80  The complaint thus set three causes of 
action.  First, the plaintiffs alleged that as a direct result of the state distribution 
formula for schools, substantial disparities existed in the quality and extent of 
educational opportunities.81  Second, the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of 
such an education finance distribution formula, they were likewise required to 
pay higher tax rates in order to obtain the same or lesser educational 
opportunity.82  Third, the plaintiffs alleged that these realities worked jointly to 
deny children the equal protection of the laws, to deny them their fundamental 
rights to education, and to make the quality of education a function of 
residence such that quality varied in response to local district wealth.83  Given 
 
 77. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572, 572-73 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d, 397 U.S. 44 
(1970); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Tex. 1969); McInnis 
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 327-29 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 
1971). 
 78. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1241. 
 79. Id. at 1244, 1249. 
 80. Id. at 1249-50, 1255. 
 81. Id. at 1244. 
 82. Id. at 1245. 
 83. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1245. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 545 
these causes, the plaintiffs in Serrano sought to invalidate the state aid 
distribution formula under the federal and state constitutions.84 
The California Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs on every cause.85  
The court provided numerous condemning statements concerning unequal 
educational opportunity.86  In establishing the facts, the state supreme court 
first noted that the root of the disparity was unmistakable, in that aid was 
insufficient to offset the widely disparate assessed valuation per pupil in 
Baldwin Park of $3,706, as compared to Beverly Hills’ valuation of $50,885 
per pupil, a ratio of 1:13.87  Second, the state supreme court noted that state aid 
actually widened the gap between rich and poor school districts, as aid was 
distributed irrespective of wealth so that rich and poor districts alike were 
aided by the state.88  Third, the court noted that such aid was effectively 
meaningless to poor districts.89  In its ruling regarding wealth suspectness, the 
state supreme court rejected the state’s traditional claim that suspectness lay 
only with individual wealth, stating that: 
To allot more educational dollars to the children of one district than to those of 
another merely because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make 
the quality of a child’s education dependent upon the location of private 
commercial and industrial establishments, surely, this is to rely on the most 
irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational financing.90 
The court further stated, “we reject defendants’ underlying thesis that 
classification by wealth is constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the 
district, not the individual.  We think that discrimination on the basis of district 
wealth is equally invalid.”91 
Similarly, in ruling for fundamentality, the California Supreme Court 
turned to both law and logic to justify its position.  The court stated that 
education in a modern industrial state was indispensable and noted that 
education had two major distinguishing attributes that qualified it as a 
fundamental right.92  First, the court stated that education was a “major 
determinant of an individual’s chances for economic and social success in our 
competitive society.”93  Second, the court noted that education was a unique 
influence on the development of citizens and their place in political and 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1244. 
 86. Id. at 1244, 1255-59. 
 87. Id. at 1248. 
 88. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1248. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1252-53. 
 91. Id. at 1252. 
 92. Id. at 1255. 
 93. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255-56. 
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community life.94  The court then turned to its own thinking and the California 
State Constitution in declaring fundamentality.  In comparing education to 
other fundamental rights, the Justices stated “[w]e think that from a larger 
perspective, education may have far greater social significance than a free 
transcript or a court-appointed lawyer.”95  The court then considered the 
education article of the California State Constitution,96 declaring 
fundamentality on five bases.  First, education was essential to free enterprise 
democracy.97  Second, education was universally relevant.98  Third, unlike 
other government services, public education continued for a lengthy period of 
time.99  Fourth, education was unmatched in molding youth and society.100  
And fifth, education was so important that the state had made it compulsory.101  
The state supreme court then ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to strict 
scrutiny review of equal protection and that the federal and state equal 
protection clauses were both impermissibly violated.102 
Although Rodriguez would later invalidate the federal claims in Serrano, 
the case was powerful and decisive for education finance reform across the 
nation.  First, Serrano proved that the meaning of equal educational 
opportunity could be so broadly sweeping as to include education finance.  
Second, Serrano proved that states could be vulnerable to constitutional attack, 
even though the federal courts had been unassailable.  Third, under state 
provisions Serrano successfully established all three claims of fundamentality, 
wealth suspectness, and equal protection.  Fourth, Serrano had an immediate 
and profound effect, sparking dramatic reform of state aid distribution 
formulas in many states.  Finally, Serrano compelled the flurry of reform both 
through legal standards and by the court’s view on how inequity might be 
redressed.  Serrano proposed several alternatives, including full state funding 
and statewide taxation. 
The impact of Serrano was accelerated by the New Jersey Superior Court’s 
1972 decision of Robinson v. Cahill.103  The plaintiffs had alleged that the state 
education finance distribution formula violated federal and state equal 
 
 94. Id. at 1256. 
 95. Id. at 1258. 
 96. Article IX of the California Constitution states: “A general diffusion of knowledge and 
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the 
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, 
and agricultural improvement.”  CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 97. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258-59. 
 98. Id. at 1259. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1259, 1263. 
 103. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), aff’d as mod., 303 
A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
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protection laws and the fundamental right to an education, in that tax revenues 
varied greatly by school district wealth and were inadequately unequalized by 
the state of New Jersey.104  According to the plaintiffs, there existed a state 
denial of equal educational opportunity and equal protection by making the 
quality of education dependent on the wealth of each local school district.105  
The plaintiffs argued that New Jersey had abrogated its responsibility to public 
elementary and secondary education because the state statutes were not equal 
in effect on all citizens, as equal tax effort did not produce equal tax yield, 
despite the fact that state aid provided approximately 28 percent of all school 
district revenues.106  The trial court agreed in principle, and the case was taken 
on appeal by the state supreme court.107 
The 1973 New Jersey Supreme Court ruling, which came after Rodriguez, 
was notable for many important reasons.  First, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
refused to rule for fundamentality, perceptively noting a profound hesitancy in 
Rodriguez that had been overlooked by plaintiffs.108  The United States 
Supreme Court had said that: 
Every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the 
relationship between national and state power under our federal system . . . [i]t 
would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our 
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate 
systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every 
State.109 
Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme 
Court had never cited Brown as a case involving the fundamental right 
concept, stating that Brown would point the opposite direction because it 
declared education to be a most important function of state and local 
governments.110  Third, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to find wealth 
to be a suspect class, noting that “if this is held to constitute classification 
according to ‘wealth’, and therefore ‘suspect’, our political structure will be 
fundamentally changed.”111  Under these conditions, the court could find no 
basis for fundamentality or federal Equal Protection Clause violations.112  But 
critical to reform, the New Jersey Supreme Court nonetheless ruled the state 
system unconstitutional by invoking the education article of the state 
 
 104. Id. at 214. 
 105. Id. at 213-14. 
 106. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 276-77, 279, 296. 
 107. Id. at 276. 
 108. Id. at 281-82. 
 109. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973). 
 110. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 284. 
 111. Id. at 283. 
 112. Id. at 279-80. 
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constitution that demanded a “thorough and efficient” system of education.113  
A requirement that was not met due to a lack of equalization in revenues and 
thus a violation of the state’s equal protection clause.114 
Robinson was of equal or greater significance than either Serrano or 
Rodriguez.  As the first test to follow the federal debacle in Rodriguez, 
Robinson was proof that plaintiffs could potentially prevail at the state level.  
While a ruling for fundamentality and suspectness would have strengthened 
reform, critics were overlooking an enormous legal lever, in that Robinson 
showed that education finance litigation did not necessarily have to turn on 
fundamentality.  Robinson found no need to rely on tenuous Brown analogies.  
The genuine effect of Robinson was not in its failure to establish coveted 
claims, but rather in prevailing solely on the education article of the state 
constitution.  Robinson thereby opened the possibility of technical examination 
of state aid distribution formulas with analysis centered on whether they 
worked sufficiently well so as to not deny equal protection of state laws.  In 
sum, Robinson greatly aided reform by helping to move from high-risk 
litigation strategies that depended too heavily on ephemeral constitutional 
analysis. 
The ruling of the Robinson Court revealed the third approach of an 
emerging school finance litigation strategy.115  Although the federal case had 
failed, Serrano and Robinson taken together indicated that plaintiffs could still 
bring claims for equal protection and fundamentality wherein an adverse 
federal ruling on the fundamentality would not negatively affect equal 
protection claims under interpretation of the education clause of individual 
state constitutions.  Since the Tenth Amendment had cast educational 
responsibility to the states, this strategy would apply universally, because all 
states had included some statement in their respective constitutions concerning 
education.  The fundamentality claim, while not equally universal, should 
always be made, as it might succeed in some states.  The strategy thus shifted 
to multiple prongs with sub-parts.  The first prong of any challenge to a state 
aid distribution formula would direct the assault toward state courts.  The 
second prong would seek relief under both federal and state provisions for 
equal protection.  The third prong would seek a ruling for fundamentality in 
hopes of securing strict scrutiny review.  The fourth prong would challenge the 
education finance distribution formula under analysis of the education articles, 
wherein chances for success could depend upon the courts’ analysis of the state 
 
 113. Id. at 294-95, 297. 
 114. Id. at 276-77, 295, 297. 
 115. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 368-69 (N.J. 1990); Robinson, 303 A.2d at 294.  At the 
time of this writing the state supreme court has issued thirteen education finance opinions with 
the most recent being Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) [hereinafter Abbott VII].  See 
also Stabaus v. Whitman, 770 A.2d 1222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Keaveney v. New 
Jersey Dept. of Educ., 2000 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 814 (N.J. Off. of Admin. L. 2000). 
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constitutional framers’ intent, the inclinations of each state court, persuasive 
litigation from other states, and the strength of the language of the state 
education article itself.  In this manner, a rational basis test might also be 
sufficient to win. 
The decisions and strategies derived from Rodriguez, Serrano, and 
Robinson have provided a legacy of intense litigation in most of the states.  
Since 1971, state aid plans have been held unconstitutional at the state supreme 
court level in a number of states.116  These states have spurred the hopes of 
reformers, as each instance has provided another opportunity for determining 
the elements of successful state constitutional analysis.  However, these 
strategies have not always rendered plaintiffs victorious, as state courts have 
reached different conclusions when confronted with the unique provisions of 
each state’s statutes.  It has been suggested that in order for either the plaintiffs 
or the state to win, a party must have an overall strategy of an outstanding legal 
team, an outstanding team of education finance experts, and a thorough 
understanding of the education finance research.117 
While litigation has succeeded in many states, education finance 
distribution formulas have also been upheld in other states where courts have 
found for the defendant state.  State education finance distribution formulas 
have been challenged at various times and with various results.118 
 
 116. In Alabama, see Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 109-10 (Ala. 1993); Siegelman 
v. Alabama Ass’n of Sch. Bd., 819 So.2d 568, 583 (Ala. 2001).  In Arizona, see Roosevelt 
Elementary  Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz. 1994).  In Arkansas, see Dupree v. 
Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90, 93-95 (Ark. 1983).  But see Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 
10 S.W.3d 892, 899-900 (Ark. 2000).  In Connecticut, see Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 
(Conn. 1977); Sheff v. O’Neil, 733 A.2d 925, 927-28, 943 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).  In Kentucky, 
see Rose v. The Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989).  In Montana, see 
Helena Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689-90 (Mont. 1989).  In South Carolina, see Abbeville 
v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540-41 (S.C. 1999).  In Texas, see Edgewood v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 
397-98 (Tex. 1989).  In Washington, see Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 585 
P.2d 71, 92-95 (Wash. 1978).  In West Virginia, see Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863-64, 878 
(W.Va. 1979).  In Wyoming, see Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 
332, 340 (Wyo. 1980). 
 117. R. Craig Wood, School Finance Litigation in America, General Session Address Before 
the Education Law Ass’n Annual Meeting (Nov., 1992) (source on file with author). 
 118. For examples in specific states, see the following cases: in Colorado, Lujan v. Colorado 
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Col. 1982); in Florida, Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness v. 
Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996); the most recent case at the time of this writing was Honore v. 
Florida State Bd. of Educ., No. 99-17 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999), dismissed; in Georgia, McDaniels v. 
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); in Idaho, Thompson v. Engleking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 
1975); in Illinois, Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); in Kansas, 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); see also Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1739, 
2003 WL 23002704 (Kan. 2003); in Maine, Sawyer v. Gilmore, 83 A. 673 (Me. 1912); in 
Maryland, Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); in Michigan, 
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 419 Mich. 943 (1984); in Minnesota, Skeen v. State, 505 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
550 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:531 
Several states have ruled that portions of the state education finance 
distribution formula were unconstitutional, i.e., the distribution of capital 
outlay financial assistance in Idaho119 and the methodology of funding classes 
for English language learners in Arizona.120  Several state supreme courts have 
issued rulings which have overruled a previous state supreme court decision 
and thereby changed the state education finance distribution formula.  These 
include Arizona, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. 121 
From this overall litigation, significant features have emerged.  First, the 
supreme courts in a number of states have declared that education is a 
fundamental right based on the state constitution.122  Second, based on the state 
constitution, there are many states in which the highest court has declared that 
education is not a fundamental right.123  Third, due to strict scrutiny sometimes 
being applicable, there has been no perfect pattern in which establishing 
fundamentality has automatically invalidated a state finance distribution 
formula by virtue of invoking coveted strict scrutiny.  For example, the 
Arizona Supreme Court found that education was a fundamental right but 
nonetheless ruled for the state in Shoftstall v. Hollins in 1973.124  Similarly, the 
Wisconsin court declared in Buse v. Smith that education was a fundamental 
right125 but later noted in Kukor that a rational basis was all that was required 
to uphold the state aid distribution formula when absolute denial of education 
 
N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); in Montana, State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont. 
1974); in New Hampshire, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, (N.H. 1993); see 
also Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000); in North Dakota, Bismarck Pub. Sch. v. 
State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); in Oklahoma, Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma v. State, 
746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); in Oregon, Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1979); see also 
Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991), Withers v. State, 891 
P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), enforced, 987 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); in Pennsylvania, 
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); in Virginia, Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 
(Va. 1994); and in Wisconsin, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000); Kukor v. Grover, 
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). 
 119. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998). 
 120. Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp. 2d 937 (D. Ariz. 1999) (the court ordered an adequacy 
study). 
 121. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) 
(effectively overturned the previous Arizona State Supreme Court ruling in Shofstall v. Hollins, 
515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973)); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v.  State, 74 P.3d 258 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. (2003); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997), modified, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 
2000), modified, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) (overturning Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of 
Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979)); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 
1997); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
 122. Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142; Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (Wis. 1976); Shofstall, 
515 P.2d at 592. 
 123. McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 167; Thompson, 537 P.2d at 647; Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018. 
 124. Shofstall, 515 P.2d at 592-93. 
 125. Buse, 247 N.W.2d at 149. 
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is not at question.126  Fourth, the harshness of this reality has been somewhat 
softened by the logic of Robinson, as several state supreme courts have ruled 
for plaintiffs by finding equality a requirement, even absent the one feature of 
fundamentality that would invoke strict scrutiny analysis.127  Only one state 
other than California has declared wealth a suspect class, when the Wyoming 
Supreme Court in Washakie invalidated its education finance distribution 
formula, establishing that no equality could exist until funding was also 
equal.128 
V.  RECENT ADEQUACY LAWSUITS 
In recent years an additional movement has emerged in challenging the 
state finance distribution formulas.129  That is, the plaintiffs argue that the state 
aid distribution formula is fiscally inadequate.130  Thus, it is argued that the 
state aid distribution formula fails the state constitutional mandate and the 
applicable statutory mandates for an education that meets minimal standards.  
A few of these suits have emerged after the applicable state supreme court has 
ruled that equity was either already met or only the legislature could define 
such a concept.131  In a few instances, these suits essentially questioned the 
concept of “the equality of poverty.”132  That is to say, if a state aid distribution 
formula allocates funds in an equitable manner, but such funds were by 
definition unable to meet various educational and academic standards, such a 
distribution formula would be inadequate by definition.  The question then 
becomes whether the distribution formula then violates the applicable 
constitutional and statutory obligations of the state. 
 
 126. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 580, 582. 
 127. See, e.g., Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 811, 814-16 (declining to reach the issue of a 
“fundamental right”). 
 128. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980). 
 129. See McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); 
Campaign for Fiscal Equality, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003); Leandro v. State, 468 
S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003); DeRolph v. State, 
677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995). 
 130. See James Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling ‘Adequacy’ to Achieve Reality: 
Translating Adequacy into State School Finance Distribution Arrangements, in EQUITY AND 
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 209 (Helen F. Ladd, et al. eds. 
1999). 
 131. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Tex. 1991) (Gonzalez, J., 
concurring). 
 132. See, e.g., Leandro, 468 S.E.2d at 547.  See also Deborah A. Verstegen, The New 
Finance: Today’s High Standards Call for a New Way of Funding Education, AM. SCH. BD. J. 
(2002), available at http://www.asbj.com/schoolspending/resources1002verstegen.html (Equity 
targets alone cannot determine whether there is an “equality of poverty” – that is, whether all 
students are receiving fewer dollars than necessary to implement state standards). 
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Various states have unwittingly established a standard by which many 
plaintiff groups are able to question and quantitatively establish noncompliance 
via the state distribution formula.  That is to say, in the movement toward 
greater educational accountability and raising academic standards for the 
public schools of a given state, the legislature has, unsuspectingly, defined by 
statute what makes an adequate education.  Thus, when school districts are not 
able to meet those stated standards, due to fiscal constraints placed upon them 
by various statutes and economic realities, the plaintiffs argue for relief.  The 
relief sought is a declaration that the state aid distribution formula is 
unconstitutional. 
In recent years, state legislatures have faced an increasing number of 
challenges to the state financial distribution formula based on the concept of 
adequacy.  Generally, plaintiffs are not challenging the equity of the 
distribution formula.133  Instead, the plaintiffs are challenging the fact that the 
distribution formula either does not allow for adjustments for certain 
classification of students, i.e., at-risk students; or the plaintiffs utilize the fact 
that certain groups of children are not achieving certain levels on state imposed 
standardized tests.134  The plaintiffs argue that by virtue of the fact that certain 
groups of children are underachieving on these state imposed sanctions, the 
distribution formula is, by definition, inadequate, at least for these groups of 
children.135 
Also, it has become increasingly common for states to attempt to 
determine the adequacy of public education.  In September 2003, North Dakota 
released a cost study that estimated that a thirty-one percent increase was 
necessary to fund public elementary and secondary education adequately.136  In 
1998, the South Carolina School Boards Association commissioned an 
adequacy study, which determined that funding would have to increase by fifty 
percent in 1998 dollars to meet the state imposed standards by 2010.137  At the 
time of this writing, several states are exploring the measurement of adequacy.  
One example is California, which has established the California Quality 
Education Commission, charged with the responsibility of determining the 
educational components, fiscal resources, and corresponding costs necessary 
so that students can meet academic performance standards.138  The state of 
 
 133. Montoy v. State, 2003 WL 22902963, at *19 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 2003). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. JOHN AUGENBLICK ET AL., AN ESTIMATION OF IMPLEMENTING THE RESULTS OF THE 
SCHOOL FINANCE ADEQUACY STUDY UNDERTAKEN BY AUGENBLICK, PALAICH AND 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 10 (2003). 
 137. Advocacy Center for Children’s Educational Success with Standards, Finance Litigation, 
at http://www.accessednetwork.org/litigation/lit_sc.html (for more information, see the complete 
report at http://www.thescea.org/pdf/schoolfunding.pdf). 
 138. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 64200(a) (2002). 
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Oregon established the Quality Education Commission, which published the 
Quality Education Model utilizing three broad based panels to determine the 
costs of an adequate education in the state of Oregon.139 
Determining the adequacy of public elementary and secondary education 
is, at best, a difficult task.  In attempting to determine adequacy there are two 
basic models currently in practice.  These models attempt to estimate a base 
cost figure by which to establish state aid.140  These two models consist of 
what is referred to as the Successful Schools/Districts Model and the 
Professional Judgment Model.141  Each has virtues and vices.  Presently, the 
state of education finance reveals that the determination of adequacy tends to 
center around the Successful Schools/Districts Model.  It is important to note 
that in the Successful Schools/Districts Model, the approach attempts to 
determine the foundational level, which would then become the model by 
which school districts are funded.142 
In the Successful Schools/Districts Model, one can articulate that 
subjectivity is limited by simply determining the successful schools/districts 
based on achievement in relationship to expenditures.  Success can be defined 
in a number of ways as determined by the state.  Generally, a number of school 
districts are selected to represent a cross section so as to reflect wealthy, as 
well as poor, districts.143  The Professional Judgment Model calls for a panel of 
practicing educators, as well as state and local policymakers, to determine what 
constitutes an adequate education.144  Once this adequate education is 
determined, then the task is to determine the actual costs of such a program.145  
It is important to note within this model that the task is to determine an 
adequate education, not an excellent education. 
Additionally, there are variations of the two models.  Some additional 
models include examining the costs of successful schools regardless of 
whether they are in the public or private sector.146  Thus, this model would 
utilize data for the basis of developing a foundational level.  It is also possible 
to utilize statistical analysis that would account for numerous variables to 
determine the foundational level.147 
 
 139. QUALITY EDUCATION COMMISSION, OREGON’S QUALITY EDUCATION MODEL 2002 30 
(2002). 
 140. See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 130, at 228. 
 141. JOHN G. MORGAN, TN. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, FUNDING 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: IS THE BEP ADEQUATE? iii (2003). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 130, at 228. 
 145. Id. at 228-29. 
 146. See MORGAN, supra note 142, at iii. 
 147. This following portion borrows extensively from R. C. WOOD AND D. C. THOMPSON, 
FINANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EDUCATION (publication forthcoming 2004). 
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Two major fundamental issues have emerged in recent years that are 
beginning to exert major influence in the arena of education finance litigation.  
The first concept is that states have begun to develop values and goals for 
public schools in terms of student achievement and standards.148  Unwittingly, 
these have led to a quantitative standard of the success or failure of school 
districts.  As discussed previously, this has led to the argument that, by 
definition, these schools have failed and thus are deemed to be inadequate.  A 
second, and larger, thrust has emerged as perhaps an unintended consequence 
of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) passed by Congress in 
December 2001.149  This federal law, based on the concept of standards based 
reform, requires each state to develop its own standards and to identify those 
schools that fail those standards as well as those schools that do not make 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) toward meeting those standards.150  Thus, in 
virtually every state, the plaintiffs will be able to access, examine, and analyze 
fully each school district’s data, school by school, in order to determine which 
schools are not making AYP.  Then, by extension, the state has demonstrated, 
on its own terms and via federal statute, which schools are failing to meet AYP 
and, regardless of the state aid distribution formula, are deemed to be 
“inadequate” by such a definition.  In fact, one could speculate that this 
strategy will be piloted in a handful of states and, if successful, will lead to the 
next major wave of public education finance distribution challenges. 
Specifically, the NCLB calls for the identification of schools that are in 
“need of improvement” or are “subject to corrective action.”151  These 
standards of identification also call for schools to be identified that are 
“unsafe.”152  The standards call for all schools to have one hundred percent of 
students achieve proficiency on a state standardized test by the year 2014.153  
Schools in many states are projected to improve to meet the NCLB standards 
in the future.154  Under NCLB, each state sets its own standards.  While this is 
certainly subject to criticism from a variety of sources, it is interesting to note 
that it will, in the long run, assist plaintiffs in education finance distribution 
challenges in that because the state set the standard, issues of reliability and 
validity are not germane to the state’s defense. 
Increasingly, more states are attempting to determine the true costs of 
providing an adequate public elementary and secondary education.  In some 
 
 148. See Guthrie & Rothstein, supra note 130, at 214. 
 149. No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et. seq. (2002). 
 150. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B). 
 151. Id. § 6316(a)(1)(B). 
 152. Id. § 7912(a). 
 153. House Research, Adequate Yearly Progress Under the No Child Left Behind Act (2003), 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/ssayp.pdf. 
 154. Accord Washington Partners, LLC., AYP: Progress and Challenges (2003), at 
http://www.wpllc.net/pdf/Backgroundforconference.pdf. 
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instances, this is the result of a suit in which the court directs the legislature to 
determine such an attempt.  In this manner, funding formula distribution 
patterns and amounts can be obtained for the state.  Specifically, this was the 
result of a long history of litigation concerning the funding distribution patterns 
in the state of Arkansas.155  The Arkansas Supreme Court directed the state to 
conduct an adequacy study.156  The court placed a January 2004 deadline for 
the legislature to remedy the state aid distribution formula that it found to 
violate the state constitution.157  As a result, in September 2003, the Arkansas 
Joint Committee on Educational Adequacy released a report entitled, An 
Evidence-Based Approach to School Finance Adequacy in Arkansas.158  This 
report determined that the overall spending for public elementary and 
secondary education would have to increase by thirty-three percent to become 
adequate and to achieve the state’s standards.159 
The state of Ohio has adopted a convoluted method of judging the 
adequacy of the education finance distribution formula.160  In 1997, the state 
supreme court in DeRolph v. State ruled that the state education finance 
distribution formula was unconstitutional and remanded the case to the 
common pleas court.161  The state supreme court directed the legislature to 
change the distributional formula.162  Despite efforts by the governor and the 
legislature to fund public elementary and secondary education, the plaintiffs 
again brought suit as to compliance, and the order was clarified.163  The state 
appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court allowed additional time for 
compliance.164  The state supreme court then ruled that the funding system was 
still unconstitutional.165 After this decision, the legislature, again, increased 
 
 155. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Hucabee, 10 S.W.3d 892 (Ark. 
2000).  See also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 76 S.W.3d 250 
(Ark. 2002); Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No.25 of Phillips County, 917 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 
1996). 
 156. See Huckabee, 10 S.W.3d at 894. 
 157. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 511 (Ark. 
2002). 
 158. Molly A. Hunter, Advocacy Center for Children’s Educational Success with Standards, 
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 163. DeRolph v. State, 699 N.E.2d 518, 519 (Ohio 1998); DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886, 
887 (Ohio 1997). 
 164. DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1022 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter DeRolph II]. 
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funding for public education by well over one billion dollars.166  In September 
2001, the court issued DeRolph III, directing remedial measures for the 
legislature.167  In December of 2001, the court appointed a mediator to work 
with the parties.168  In March of 2002, the mediator stated that he had failed to 
produce an agreement between the parties.169 
The court vacated DeRolph III and held that DeRolph I and DeRolph II 
were the law of the state and that the school funding system was 
unconstitutional.170  In March of 2003, the state filed a writ of prohibition 
seeking to prevent the court of common pleas from exercising any further 
jurisdiction.171  On May 16, 2003, the Ohio State Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in State v. Lewis, in which it ended further litigation by declaring the 
education finance distribution formula was unconstitutional and directed the 
legislature to remedy the situation. 172  The court did not retain jurisdiction in 
this case.173 
In August of 2003, the plaintiffs filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that the state supreme court 
violated the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause by preventing the 
enforcement of a court ordered remedy and denying the plaintiffs equal 
protection because Ohio schoolchildren were treated differently than other 
successful litigants before the Ohio courts.174  In October of 2003 the Court 
denied certiorari.175 
Several states have current adequacy suits in various stages.  North 
Carolina is a prime example of a state still within the restrictions of an 
adequacy suit.  In Leandro v. State, beginning in 1995, the courts linked the 
failures of the plaintiff school districts to the state learning standards.176  After 
years of hearings and opinions, the court, in 2000, found that the failure of at-
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risk students was a function of insufficient state funding and lack of 
implementation of successful programs.177 
In Campbell County School District v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
ruled the state distributional formula unconstitutional.178  In doing so, the court 
ordered a detailed cost analysis.179  The legislature had passed and identified 
the core knowledge and skills of students so as to constitute a “proper” 
education.180  On February 23, 2001, the Wyoming Supreme Court in 
Campbell County upheld the new cost based distributional formula and stated 
that it was capable of fulfilling the constitutional guarantees.181  The court did 
note that a variety of factors should be analyzed every five years and 
adjustments due to inflation made at least every other year.182 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned the education finance 
distribution formula in 1993.183  However, Hancock v. Driscoll, which opened 
in Superior Court on June 12, 2003, will have a potential major impact on the 
future of all public schools in the state of Massachusetts.184  The case has roots 
tracing back to McDuffy v. Secretary of Education, in which the court 
originally declared the duty of the state.185  Hancock now begins its likely sixty 
to ninety day run when children from nineteen plaintiff school districts argue 
that, even “ten years after the landmark McDuffy decision, there still aren’t 
enough state and local resources to adequately educate the students to the 
standards set forth by the state’s [c]onstitution.”186 
The state of New York has presented a lengthy and far reaching adequacy 
issue.  In Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, the New York Supreme Court 
ruled that the New York City schools were inadequately funded, and therefore 
the state distributional formula was held to be unconstitutional.187  On appeal, 
the appellate court ruled on behalf of the state in requiring that the state’s 
obligation was only for certain grade level proficiencies.188  New York’s 
highest court, the Court of Appeals, on June 26, 2003, upheld the trial court, 
stating that the public schools of New York City were inadequately funded and 
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thus unconstitutional.189  The ruling also directed the state to determine the cost 
of a “sound, basic education” within the public schools of New York City.190  
In dissent, Justice Reed noted the following: 
The majority first directs the State to determine the actual cost of a “sound 
basic education” and to ensure that every school in New York City has the 
necessary funding to meet the standard, and sets a deadline.  The funding level 
must reflect the cost of a “sound basic education” that is not tied to anything 
other than a “meaningful high school education.”  The majority also remands 
the case to the trial court to review the Legislature’s efforts to determine if 
under the new funding scheme “inputs and outputs improve to a 
constitutionally acceptable level.” 
. . . This remedy is extraordinary, if not unprecedented. Having determined that 
the State is not satisfying its constitutional obligations with respect to the 
education of New York City’s public school children, we should - as the State 
requests - simply specify the constitutional deficiencies.  It is up to the 
Legislature, as the entity charged with primary responsibility under the 
Education Article for maintaining the State’s system of public education, and 
the Executive, who shares responsibility with the Legislature, to implement a 
remedy.  This lawsuit should be at an end.  Instead, the majority, observing 
that “the political process allocates to City schools a share of state aid that does 
not bear a perceptible relation to the needs of City students,” . . . casts the 
courts in the role of judicial overseer of the Legislature. This disregards the 
prudential bounds of the judicial function, if not the separation of powers. 
 Moreover, as soon as the trial court is called upon to evaluate the cost and 
educational effectiveness of whatever new programs are devised and funded to 
meet the needs of New York City’s school children, the education policy 
debate will begin anew in another long trial followed by lengthy appeals. The 
success of the new funding mechanism will then be tested by outputs 
(proficiency levels). This dispute, like its counterparts elsewhere, is destined to 
last for decades, and, as previously noted, is virtually guaranteed to spawn 
similar lawsuits throughout the state.191 
The overview of this arena indicates an uncertain patchwork of decisions.  
Yet, despite the uneven record, there are indicators of which claims have 
consistently received the most court sympathy or rejection.  First, it is 
extraordinarily rare to reach wealth as a suspect class.  As stated very early in 
Robinson, the unintended implications for society are too broad in that all other 
government services could be immediately be subject to the same claim.  
Second, fundamentality is only slightly less rare, as courts are slow to construe 
new rights from state constitutions and for which federal precedent is adverse.  
 
 189. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 2003 WL 21468502, at *20 (N.Y. 2003). 
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Third, federal equal protection is de rigueur in claim, but state equal protection 
is a key to overturning state aid distribution formulas.  This is a strategy that 
does not usually work well unless the education article can also be invoked in a 
plain reading that requires the state to accomplish what it set out to do.  For 
example, the Supreme Court of Texas in Edgewood in 1989 stated “[w]hether 
the legislature acts directly or enlists local government to help meet its 
obligation, the end product must still be what the constitution demands.”192  
Taken collectively, this suggests that favorable rulings depend at least in part 
on specific language in state constitutions.  Again, as Wood has stated, the 
successful party must have an outstanding legal team, an outstanding education 
finance research team, and a well-grounded knowledge of education finance 
research.193  While the relationship may not be perfectly incremental as 
language increases, in most instances the opportunity for success does diminish 
rapidly as language becomes more vague. 
VI.  PRINCIPLES AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN LITIGATION 
First, it may be safely stated that litigation will not achieve great success in 
federal courts.  The only exceptions to this principle rest in events that might 
cause the Supreme Court to abandon its traditional position on fundamentality, 
wealth suspectness, or broadened interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause.  Given the present composition of the Supreme Court 
and its historic reluctance to create new fundamental rights, the federal path 
will likely disappoint reformers unless a nexus to other fundamental rights can 
be better established.  Despite Plyler, the Supreme Court has stood firm in 
determining that education is a most important responsibility of state and local 
governments.194  Similarly, wealth as a suspect class is a fruitless attack, unless 
the Supreme Court unexpectedly reverses itself or unless plaintiffs can show 
overwhelming and consistent evidence of wealth-based discrimination against 
individuals.  Likewise, federal equal protection will remain largely unavailable 
except where established suspect classes can be linked to education finance.  
The only other alternative is through changes in the Supreme Court itself.  
Under these conditions, a federal plea will receive sympathy only by dramatic 
breakthroughs or by new political appointments.195 
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Second, it may be confidently stated that litigation will continue in state 
courts into the foreseeable future.  Although the record in state courts has been 
mixed, plaintiffs have achieved their only successes at this level.  Within state 
courts, it is equally evident that the plea for fundamentality will experience 
very limited success, as these courts will frequently apply the federal test in the 
absence of strong state constitutional provisions.  It must, of course, be noted 
that few state constitutions have the language needed unquestioningly to 
require strict scrutiny.196  Even when such language is present, many courts 
will hesitate at fundamentality because of the powerful analysis found long ago 
in Robinson.  In that case, the court perceptively recognized that society itself 
could be unintentionally transformed, as even noble goals could be twisted by 
hastily turning mere social conveniences into fundamental rights.  As such, 
litigation in state courts will continue to turn on issues other than 
fundamentality or wealth suspectness. 
Third, it is likely that Serrano logic will have only limited utility, as courts 
have generally moved beyond striking down education finance distribution 
formulas that are unequal without evidence that inequality results in an 
inadequate education.  While this may appear regressive, there is an attractive 
logic that underlies it.  The court in Serrano presumably did not care that the 
system could be adequate without being equal.  In contrast, most subsequent 
decisions have attempted to determine if inequality was in fact followed by 
inadequacy.  While the standard appears to be lowered, it may be ultimately 
beneficial in that plaintiffs will be required to demonstrate the link between 
resources and equal opportunity.  Although this has been a difficult hurdle for 
plaintiffs in the past, the NCLB Act and the various state standards make such 
hurdles achievable in a relatively gentle fashion. 
Fourth, the potential demise of Serrano logic also speaks to the dubious 
survival of strategies based only in noble theories and moral outrage.  The 
failure of these strategies is evident in the shambles of federal hopes after 
Brown, leading to the conclusion that though there is high regard for 
conscience in the context of the law, lawsuits are generally won by 
constitutional obligations.  Instances of “soft” litigation are rare, and the 
outrage in Pauley v. Kelly is generally nonreplicable at the state level, as is its 
level of judicial prescription.197  Likewise, Wyoming’s requirement of equal 
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 197. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979).  Pauley stands almost alone in the 
court’s willingness to engage in judicial remedy for fiscal inequities.  The court ordered creation 
of a Master Plan addressing in minute detail each deficiency of educational program and its 
support mechanism, which today has resulted in millions of new dollars to education and massive 
restructuring of education on a statewide basis that is linked to student outcomes.  For a similar 
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expenditures is not likely to recur elsewhere.  This view is especially 
reinforced in compliance litigation, as even in Serrano II198 the court was 
satisfied when most fiscal variations were erased.  This logic was also echoed 
in Horton v. Meskill, as that court, under constitutional fundamentality, 
required only that disparities not be so great as to be unconstitutional.199  This 
was also the overwhelming view of the Virginia Supreme Court in Scott v. 
Commonwealth, in which the court stated that disparities were acceptable as 
long as all school districts were minimally adequate as defined by the state 
constitution.200 
Fifth, it is likely that the Robinson strategy of scrutinizing the education 
clause of individual state constitutions will continue to be the most promising 
strategy.  This certainly applies in the latest adequacy suits.  It is also 
consistent with the foregoing, in that the greatest scrutiny will likely rest in 
how closely the state achieves its adequacy aims when measured against its 
constitutional requirements and state imposed academic accountability 
requirements.  Robinson demonstrated that fundamentality and suspectness are 
not absolute prerequisites to success, and most subsequent winning litigation 
stands as further proof to this truth.  The ephemeral and intangible nature of 
fundamental rights and wealth suspectness is frustrating to courts, in contrast 
to the more tangible concepts of equal protection and adequacy, which courts 
can usually apply to the plain reading of state education articles.  Given that 
courts typically have no dispositive proof to presume the linkage between 
wealth and opportunity, tying specific language to factual analysis in the 
context of equal protection likely explains the success of the Robinson 
strategy. 
Sixth, it is likely that different decisions will continue to be handed down 
by state courts using the Robinson strategy for several reasons.  One reason is 
simply that different constitutions state significantly different things.  A second 
reason is that courts themselves cannot examine language so dispassionately as 
to read nothing into the language except the words; i.e., words are subject to 
perceptual political/social filters.201  Still, a third reason is that the language in 
many state education articles is nearly empty.  In these cases, courts are 
 
case in Kentucky, see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W. 186, 215 (Ky. 1989), where the 
court required the total reconstruction of the educational system. 
 198. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957 (Cal. 1976) (note that the court required some 
equality but did not mandate that exactly the same amount of money goes to each student). 
 199. Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1106-07 (Conn. 1985). 
 200. Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142-43 (Va. 1994).  See also, R. Craig Wood, 
Scott v. Commonwealth: Virginia Courts Consistently Rule Against Education Finance 
Equalization Claims, in 115 WEST’S EDUC. L. R. 1 (1997). 
 201. See K. DeMoss, Political Dispositions and Education Finance Equity: An Analysis of 
Court Decisions Across the United States  (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of 
Chicago) (on file with the Univ. of Chicago Library). 
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exhibiting an interest in constitutional debate analysis wherein the court 
examines the framing of the constitution to determine the intent in the 
education article.  Although it has been suggested that many legislatures had 
no motive deeper than copying other states’ education articles, the more recent 
decisions in Kentucky and Texas seriously examined the framers’ intent in 
order to determine the meaning of “thorough and/or efficient” phrases.202  An 
increasingly common strategy combines the framers’ intent, litigation from 
similar states, measures of adequacy, or lack thereof, as well as jurisdictional 
precedent to cast a ‘plain’ reading of the education article.203  Thus decisions 
will be different among the states, with some influence by other reform, aided 
or deterred by the inclinations of the court itself. 
Seventh, it is likely that courts will always be reluctant to engage in 
specific judicial prescription as a remedy to education finance distribution 
problems because courts are bound to respect the separation of powers.  For 
decades, courts have hesitated to intervene in legislative affairs, noting that 
they have neither the power nor the expertise to prescribe solutions to political 
questions.  Courts generally rule only on questions of law brought before them 
and direct the issues to the legislatures for remedy.  As such, in one sense, 
courts are poor tools to force school finance reform, as they will almost always 
stop short of providing an actual remedy.204  In addition, the courts can actually 
frustrate reform as a favorable decision for plaintiffs by no means guarantees 
an immediate or receptive legislative response.  For example, the response to 
Edgewood in Texas was a call for a constitutional amendment that would 
nullify the court’s decision.205  Ohio, as discussed herein, appears to be no 
closer to an acceptable remedy that will satisfy the plaintiffs than it was before 
DeRolph.  Nevertheless, some progress has been wrought by litigation.  As a 
consequence, a natural tension will continue to slow reform, as courts will not 
readily pursue direct intervention strategies.206 
Eighth, it is likely that reform will be slow and will remain incomplete for 
many years.  In one sense, the legal and policy issues were identified so many 
years ago in Sawyer in 1912 when the court stated, “[t]he method of 
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distributing the proceeds of a tax rests in the wise discretion and sound 
judgment of the Legislature.  If this discretion is unwisely exercised, the 
remedy is with the people, and not with the court”207 — a view consistently 
upheld and confirmed by Rodriguez.  Thus, it should be noted that legislatures 
may engage in policies that are perhaps unwise as long as these policies are not 
unconstitutional.  Under these conditions, it would seem that reform has gained 
little ground.  Yet, it is encouraging to note that standards do change with the 
times, as contemporary views regarding inequality have led to significant 
judicial intervention by state courts.  Indeed, Sawyer may have been right for 
the wrong reasons; i.e., justice makes few errors of haste, and rapid change is 
often available only at the voting polls.  Thus litigants expecting dramatic 
results may be disappointed.  But it still should be stated that deliberateness 
can be beneficial, as dizzying change may be unwise public policy. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The net sum of over a quarter century of intense education finance 
litigation proves that the outcome of future lawsuits cannot be known.  Too 
many variables impact an ever-changing social milieu, and the courts 
themselves are never certain of whether to lead or to reflect society’s thinking.  
Courts seem to be at times ahead of the political readiness, while in other 
obvious ways they lag behind.  The political climate of legislatures adds to this 
uncertainty, as states themselves shape the frequency and intensity of litigation 
by the legislatures’ relative vigilance to equity concerns.  While no amount of 
money can ever satisfy litigants, they are better satisfied when the distribution 
is fair and minimally adequate.  Legislatures, however, are generally faced 
with competing demands from all corners of society for which sufficient 
funding is beyond the means of the state.  Yet there has been great change as a 
result of litigation, as states have assumed greater shares, taxes have been 
better equalized, and expenditures have increased.  In addition, reform has 
become a political agenda seized upon by presidents, governors, and 
legislators.  Thus, while equity has far to go, the power of a court should never 
be underestimated; if it were not for litigation, it is absolutely certain that less 
progress toward fundamental fairness in the financing of public elementary and 
secondary education would exist today. 
Although these conditions indicate that only uncertainty itself is certain, 
the long-range view still demands optimism. The political pendulum swings, 
and equity and adequacy will continue to rise and fade in cycles.  It cannot be 
otherwise because people will protect their resources, giving rise to disputes.  
Public elementary and secondary education remain great and noble causes 
because life’s opportunities are in large measure a product of the education 
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received in childhood.  If educational funding is inadequate to these ends, then 
children in all social and economic circumstances should experience the 
inadequacy on equal terms. 
 
